Дальнейшие сценарии развития России

[Чайник777]

когда в Рейхе хватали евреев, репрессии тоже были «точечными»

Конечно же нет. Когда человека наказывают только за принадлежность к определённой группе то эо массовые репрессии.

[2Easy]

Totalitarian regimes are different from other authoritarian regimes, as the latter denotes a state in which the single power holder, usually an individual dictator, a committee, a military junta, or an otherwise small group of political elites, monopolizes political power.[24] A totalitarian regime may attempt to control virtually all aspects of social life, including the economy, the education system, arts, science, and the private lives and morals of citizens through the use of an elaborate ideology.[25] It can also mobilize the whole population in pursuit of its goals

Как по мне, считать автократию и тоталитаризм двумя взаимоисключающими явлениями так же неверно, как некоторые считают взаимоисключающими явлениями нацизм и фашизм. Например московский режим совпадает и по атрибутам автократии, и по атрибутам тоталитаризма, указанным в этом тексте.

[Euskaldun]

и что по вашей ссылке не соответствует современному мордору? власть (по крайней мере публично) в руках одного пересидента почти 30 лет, бизнес у всех неугодных отжали, полиция хватает за неугодные надписи в сортирах, не стесняясь, по федеральным каналам восхваляют геноцид соседнего народа. что вам еще надо «для полного счастья»?

[Euskaldun]

И да, переписывание учебников истории - это признак тоталитаризма, как и «разговоры о главном». Автократы такой херней не страдают, им интереснее власть, а не мозги сношать молодому поколению

[Сергей]

А как вы определяете тоталитарный тип режима? На глазок? Режим до Сво был точно не тоталитарный потому что пропагандировал максимальную отстранённость людей от политики. А при тоталитарном мы бы тут все ходили стройными рядами и все как один требовали расстрелять предателей как бешеных собак. А по факту все эти годы предлагалось сидеть дома и возделывать свой огород. А нужные люди за нас всё делали как надо. И репрессии были точечными.

Так в этом и суть: раньше надо было сидеть тихо, а теперь надо умереть за Путина. Тут никакое хождение колоннами и рядом не стояло.

[2Easy]

Люто плюсую. Именно поэтому я здесь и выразил неудовольствие Екатериной Шульман, что люди не поняли. Мягкой автократией этот режим был в нулевые годы, а сейчас он если и не полностью тоталитарный, то определенно со многими чертами тоталитаризма. Гибридный режим, так сказать, но не среднее между демократией и авторитаризмом, как этот термин обычно понимают, а между авторитаризмом и тоталитаризмом.

А как вы определяете тоталитарный тип режима? На глазок? Режим до Сво был точно не тоталитарный потому что пропагандировал максимальную отстранённость людей от политики. А при тоталитарном мы бы тут все ходили стройными рядами и все как один требовали расстрелять предателей как бешеных собак. А по факту все эти годы предлагалось сидеть дома и возделывать свой огород. А нужные люди за нас всё делали как надо. И репрессии были точечными.

Черносотенное политическое устройство весьма странное и противоречивое, поскольку умудряется сочетать тоталитаризм сверх-государства с безгосударственным анархизмом. Коротко принцип такой: чёрный люд управляет собой сам через своих паханов и смотрящих, но при этом полностью во власти белого люда (знати и духовенства), который стрижёт с него деньги, набирает в войска, подчиняет своим законам и своему мировоззрению. Чёрный люд аполитичен только в отсутствие возможностей хоть сколько-нибудь влиять на белый люд, что не лишает белый люд возможностей влиять на чёрный. И в то же время чёрный активно вовлечён в политику на местном уровне.

[Чайник777]

Так в этом и суть: раньше надо было сидеть тихо, а теперь надо умереть за Путина. Тут никакое хождение колоннами и рядом не стояло.

Раньше от общества немного требовалось - не лезте в политику и всё будет в шоколаде. А в тоталитарной системе нужно постоянно доказывать свою лояльность, вступать в пионеров, ходить на митинги и горячо любить партию и вождя.

[Владимир]

Мнение Иноземцева по поводу того как запад ошибся в оценке России: https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/westliche-fehleinschaetzungen-russland-haelt-sich-erstaunlich-gut-ld.1720487?fbclid=IwAR1IysqZTCk12Bm43AM8yNj9lqjdh5YR7kwuJ2PqNZdP9umET9BS-c-nNvs&mibextid=Zxz2cZ

Там регистрироваться надо.. Впрочем, из саммари "Der «Paria» Russland hält sich erstaunlich gut – viele westliche Fehleinschätzungen wurzeln in dem chauvinistischen Gefühl, dass Abweichungen vom eigenen System ohnehin nichts taugen können" понятно, что мнение В. Иноземцева не ново, хотя и бесспорно: РФ не является демократической страной с рыночной экономикой, поэтому собственные проекции Запада на неё ошибочны и бесполезны. 

[Euskaldun]

Мнение Иноземцева по поводу того как запад ошибся в оценке России: https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/westliche-fehleinschaetzungen-russland-haelt-sich-erstaunlich-gut-ld.1720487?fbclid=IwAR1IysqZTCk12Bm43AM8yNj9lqjdh5YR7kwuJ2PqNZdP9umET9BS-c-nNvs&mibextid=Zxz2cZ

какая пафосная чушь а уж какой «юбермахт» - так все увидели в виде надувных резиновых танков

[2Easy]

Мнение Иноземцева по поводу того как запад ошибся в оценке России: https://www.nzz.ch/meinung/westliche-fehleinschaetzungen-russland-haelt-sich-erstaunlich-gut-ld.1720487?fbclid=IwAR1IysqZTCk12Bm43AM8yNj9lqjdh5YR7kwuJ2PqNZdP9umET9BS-c-nNvs&mibextid=Zxz2cZ

Можете скопировать статью сюда, чтобы всему форуму не пришлось регистрироваться на этом сайте?

[Euskaldun]

Всё что нужно знать, о тнз «либерале» Иноземцеве:

В июне 2019 года в своём личном блоге на сайте радиостанции «Эхо Москвы» высказался в поддержку предоставления независимости ОРДЛО[42]:

[Чайник777]

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Spoiler: ShowHide

GUEST COMMENT
The “pariah” Russia is holding up surprisingly well – many Western misjudgments are rooted in the chauvinistic feeling that deviations from one's own system are useless anyway
The Ukraine war has now lasted almost a year, and hardly anyone is still hoping that it could come to an end soon. The West had hoped to be able to use sanctions to break the Russian military supremacy. The bill didn't add up.

Vladislav L. Inosemtsev
285 comments
01/28/2023, 5:30 a.m

Russia's war against Ukraine has been going on for almost a year now, and there is little sign of an end to it any time soon. It is now becoming clear that Western politicians and experts have made many serious misjudgments: regarding the resilience of the Russian economy, regarding the steadfastness of Putin's regime and even regarding the capabilities of the Russian defense industry, which the military continues to use able to supply most of the required ammunition.


What were the biggest misjudgments and how did they come about? These questions are of crucial importance for the elaboration of the further strategy.

Arguably the biggest mistake in the West was considering the February 24 attack as "Putin's war." The reasons for this are obvious: some sincerely believed that the Russian people could not seek war with their closest neighbor; others supported this view by trying to pit the Russians and their ruler against each other in the hope that the contradiction might result in an uprising against the regime. Alongside this, an illusion was fostered that was intended to encourage both the Ukrainians and their allies: they argued that what they were dealing with was not the whole Russian nation but a political gang in the Kremlin.

growing approval
These and other perspectives have created a misleading picture that should now be corrected. Eleven months of war have shown that very few Russian soldiers have deserted or resigned (the number can be estimated at 3,000 to 5,000, or at most 1.5 percent of the total enlisted personnel). Even the partial mobilization of 300,000 men, which is considered delicate, did not embarrass the Putin regime any further. On the contrary, popular support has grown with it, and more and more people are arguing that Russia should do its best to crush the Ukrainian enemy.

Like Saddam Hussein's defeat in Kuwait in 1991, Putin could survive the failure of his Ukrainian adventure.
The most telling point is that fewer than 1,000 Russians have joined the "Russian Freedom Legion," which is supporting Ukraine in the war. For comparison: in World War II, when the Soviet Union was attacked and engaged in a defensive war, up to 130,000 Soviet citizens fought on the side of the Wehrmacht in the ranks of the "Russian Liberation Army", and the number of those willing to help was as many as 800,000 , many of whom carried guns.


It is important to face the fact that the war, even if it started as Putin's war, is increasingly becoming a war that is arguably supported by the majority of Russians.

The desire to break rules
The Russians are committing hundreds of war crimes in Ukraine, not because they hate Ukrainians or are doing their best to fulfill their leader's wishes. Most young soldiers were simply freed from the constraints they faced at home.

In the late 1910s, Russian men in "peaceful" Russia had murdered up to 5,000 women a year in their families and in their partnerships, in many cases with unimaginable brutality. The propensity for violence was so strong that in 2017 the government decriminalized “domestic violence” by decreeing that hitting a wife or girlfriend should only be punishable by fines (the law states that fines are only handed out in serious cases). should be used, while repeated violence can be prosecuted - but prison sentences have since disappeared from legal practice for almost all acts of violence other than murder).

The crimes committed by the Russians in Ukraine are not so much the result of orders from superiors as they express a desire to break all "civilized" norms and rules that have been imposed in Russia for years by the revival of "traditional" values ​​are undermined. The urge to steal and rob can also be explained by the material misery of the people in the poorer provinces and their unfulfillable desire to "appropriate" the wealth of the more successful people. In Russia there is a deep gulf of social and material inequality between provincial and metropolitan areas.


In short, the excesses of the Ukraine warriors reveal desires that are common to large sections of the Russian population but have hitherto remained hidden. For this reason, one should not expect active opposition to the war to arise in the coming months. Rather, silent support for the Ukraine campaign is likely to increase significantly.

Another illusion is the hope that the economic sanctions could limit the regime's willingness to continue the war. Certainly, the sanctions are eroding many fundamentals of the Russian economy, and the overall contraction in 2023 could be even sharper than in 2022 - but the Kremlin is able to keep its finances in check by using up part of the National Property Fund and increasing domestic borrowing, and this even at the central bank. As a result, Russia's ability to wage war will not be seriously affected in either 2023 or 2024.

Survive defeat
The prosperity of ordinary Russians may be falling - but Kremlin propaganda will justify this fact with "Nato aggression". On the other hand, this will make military service even more attractive to the poorest Russians. For example, if a mobilized from the Ivanovo region serves four months on the front lines before being killed, his pay and the federal and regional compensation paid to his family would add up to 20 to 23 average annual wages paid elsewhere here become.

The last important point is that even a defeat of Russia on the battlefield - which is the only means of ending the war - will not with certainty lead to the collapse of the Putin regime. The propaganda is already proclaiming that Russia is now at war not with Ukraine in particular, but with the western world or NATO in general. This approach allows a possible failure to be presented as a dramatic, but by no means definitive, episode in the long confrontation with the powers of the West.


In any case, the war with Ukraine does not look like another Great Patriotic War, and it is worth remembering that the crushing defeat suffered by the Red Army in its ill-fated attempt to retake independent Poland in 1920 was only a temporary retreat after it who was avenged massively in less than twenty years.

Like Saddam Hussein's defeat in Kuwait in 1991, Putin could survive the failure of his Ukrainian adventure. Nor would a military defeat be so catastrophic because the West has no way of enforcing reparations from Moscow for the devastation of Ukraine (although the confiscation of Russia's foreign assets carries weight as well).

Not a "normal" country
So where do all the miscalculations come from? Perhaps they stem from a deep-rooted Western feeling that most nations unlike Western nations are simply "deviations" from a "norm," and that any sign of conforming to the Western world is proof of their " Normality» applies.

Because of such a chauvinistic approach, Western politicians tend to value the views of those who support their own position while depreciating the arguments of those who oppose them. The result is that the Russian "opposition," which has been defunct since at least 2003 and is in fact a heterogeneous group of dissidents who fight each other with more fervor than they do against President Putin, is one of the most reliable sources for predictions about the future of Russia.


So far, however, most of these opposition visionaries have envisioned scenarios that bear little relation to the real dynamics of events in or around Russia, simply because most of them have been too obsessed with hating Putin to come to a nuanced one analysis of the situation.

Political activists in exile should be treated with caution as analysts. The Russian opposition groups and the "free (Russian) media" outside Russia today act less as propagators of protest among the Russian people than as their imaginary proxies.

Russia is not a "normal" country and the Russian people are not a "normal" people. Western decision-makers should – the sooner the better – become aware of this. They should prepare in their military and political strategies for the scenario of a long and hard confrontation with a non-Western, non-modern and in many ways irrational state.

[Чайник777]

Я скопировал гугл транслейт, думаю это не очень страшно, просто лапками на телефоне не очень удобно редактировать посты 

[Чайник777]

Можете скопировать статью сюда, чтобы всему форуму не пришлось регистрироваться на этом сайте?

Если с телефона заходить то у вас есть опция быстрой регистрации по эпл-айди или гугл-почте, это делается по одной кнопке, всё быстро и просто.

[Владимир]

Russia is not a "normal" country and the Russian people are not a "normal" people. Western decision-makers should – the sooner the better – become aware of this. They should prepare in their military and political strategies for the scenario of a long and hard confrontation with a non-Western, non-modern and in many ways irrational state.

А никто и не говорил, что будет легко.